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THE ROAD TO SHAPING COOPERATION in Justice and Home Affairs
(JHA) matters, a policy domain that includes immigration and
asylum issues as well as collaboration in judicial and police
matters, has been a bumpy one. Even though JHA is arguably
the most rapidly evolving policy field in the EU, progress in
this new arena has been hampered by the sensitivity of the
issues tackled in the dossier, lack of coherence and consensus,
member states’ reluctance to transfer policy-making authority
to European institutions, and the awkward institutional
structures and cumbersome intergovernmental decision-making
processes created by Maastricht Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty
attempted to tackle the causes of the lackluster policy output
by proclaiming the dawn of a European “Area of Freedom,
Security, and Justice (AFSJ).” The JHA dossier was partially
communitarized, bringing immigration, asylum, and judicial
cooperation in civil matters into the First Pillar and establishing
a timetable for the “normalization” of the decision-making
practices. At the same time, however, Amsterdam left behind
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters in a
revamped Third Pillar that was to operate intergovernmentally
for the foreseeable future. Now divided between two pillars,
JHA cooperation continued to press forward slowly, and
received another push at the special JHA Tampere European
Council in 1999.
While the blueprint adopted at Tampere certainly
contributed to the proliferation of JHA initiatives since 1999,
the attacks of September 11 have also invigorated efforts in
the EU to jointly develop policies, in particular to enhance
security internally and at the Union’s external borders in order
to combat terrorism. The attacks resulted in an unprecedented
demonstration of political will to speed up work to address
cross-border criminal matters collectively. As the European
connections of some of the attackers were uncovered, members
of the EU were confronted with their own vulnerabilities. In
short order, and with the entrepreneurial efforts of JHA
Commissioner António Vitorino, judicial and police cooperation
in criminal matters—areas that were previously eclipsed by
the Union’s emphasis on developing policies to guard its
external borders—rose to the top of the collective agenda. The
events underscored the obvious: even though member states
had traditionally not been particularly comfortable with aligning
their national legal systems or working very closely with each
other’s law enforcement units, such reticence and the resultant
incomplete integration could produce significant internal
security gaps in a frontier-free Europe. Immediately following
the attacks, the EU and its member states quickly condemned
terrorism and expressed their solidarity with the U.S. They then
embarked on developing EU-wide and transatlantic
mechanisms to combat terrorism as well as other serious trans-
border crime. Politicians were keen to demonstrate that they
were neither soft on terrorism nor slow in developing responses.
So the EU swiftly adopted anti-terrorism measures that involved
cooperation in criminal matters, most of which would surely
have taken years to discuss and adopt were it not for the unusual
sense of urgency.
The unexpected political terrain of post-9/11 JHA
cooperation signaled a decisive opportunity for energizing the
member states’ individual and collective willingness to deepen
integration in JHA matters. The initial progress made—
significant by JHA standards—suggests that the member states
were interested in capitalizing on this window of opportunity.
Immediately after the attacks, member states were summoned
to an extraordinary European Council on September 21. An
October 19 meeting of the JHA Council followed with actual
policy proposals. With the notable exception of upgrading
airport security measures—which was a direct response to the
attacks—most of the items on the agenda for these meetings
were instruments that had long been under discussion. Member
states now appeared committed to fast-tracking several
initiatives that had barely been inching along earlier. Most
notably, ministers agreed to promptly develop a common EU
definition of terrorism, a common list of organizations suspected
of terrorism, a common list of serious trans-border crimes, and
a European search and arrest warrant to expedite the
apprehension of suspects involved in such crimes. In order to
boost cross-border police cooperation, the European Police
Office (Europol) was given additional responsibilities through
a new anti-terrorism unit responsible for cooperating closely
with the intelligence agencies of member states and the U.S.
(Council of the European Union, 2001a). The ministers also
committed the Union to developing a common decision on the
freezing of assets with links to suspected terrorists, and—
linking the fight against terrorism squarely to better border
controls—intensifying efforts to combat falsified and forged
travel documents and visas.             (continued)Spring 2002   EUSA Review
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Among these initiatives, the European arrest warrant
occupies a prominent position. It is designed to replace the
protracted extradition procedures between EU member states
with an automatic transfer of suspected persons from one EU
country to another. The efforts to secure timely extradition of
suspects have long been hamstrung by mistrust between the
national authorities as demonstrated, for example, by the refusal
of Belgian courts to extradite suspected Basque separatists to
Spain. Initially, it was expected that the list of 32 Euro-crimes
(among them terrorism, trafficking in human beings, corruption,
racism, forgery, rape, hijacking, kidnapping, cyber-crime,
money laundering, and fraud) to which the arrest warrant would
apply was poised for unopposed adoption, with an
implementation date of January 2003. However, as if to
demonstrate the limits of post-9/11 consensus in JHA, its
adoption encountered last minute problems when Italy—once
a staunch supporter of the EU—obstructed the initiative at the
JHA ministerial meeting on December 6-7. The ensuing five-
day impasse was attributed to the Italian justice minister and
the conservative and increasingly EU-skeptic Berlusconi
government he represented and drew indignation from several
member states as well as from Commissioner Vitorino, who
protested that progress was being “held hostage to Council
unanimity” (European Report, 2001). In the end, the Berlusconi
government—amidst criticism that the Italian resistance to the
arrest warrant was primarily motivated by concerns that
Berlusconi himself could be charged with several of the Euro-
crimes to which the warrant would apply—eventually backed
down and the initiative was adopted on December 11 with an
implementation date of 2004. The episode was understandably
traumatic for those counting on an extended honeymoon period
of consensus in post-9/11 JHA. Nonetheless, the adoption of
the arrest warrant is an important step towards giving meaning
to mutual recognition between the judiciaries of member states.
EU members will now hand over suspects (including their own
nationals) to foreign courts, even when the offence is not a
crime under their own laws. As this is a significant departure
from past practice, several member states including Portugal,
Greece, Austria and Italy will need constitutional amendments.
The Council also adopted a Common Position to combat
terrorism, which includes an EU definition of terrorism—
including acts carried out against a country and an international
organization—and proposed prison sentences for those who
plan and carry out terrorist acts. The broadly cast definition of
terrorist acts1 drew immediate criticism from human rights
activists who were concerned that the broad definition might
impinge on freedom of speech and assembly. In order to
facilitate legal cooperation in criminal cases, the JHA Council
also finalized the decision to operationalize Eurojust (the
judicial equivalent of Europol), to be seated in the Hague, and
comprised of senior lawyers, magistrates, prosecutors, judges
and other legal experts seconded from EU members to provide
timely legal advice for cross-border investigations. Finally,
shortly before Belgium handed the Presidency over to Spain, a
CFSP common position published a list of terrorist persons,
groups, and organizations. The list—circulated to EU
governments and adopted without debate—included mostly
organizations of immediate concern to member states (Council
of the European Union, 2001b).2
The EU was able to capitalize on the political opportunities
afforded by the post-9/11 consensus and make significant policy
progress on a sensitive dossier. Nonetheless, some significant
challenges remain. The EU must now keep the window of
opportunity open by maintaining the policy-making momentum,
ensuring the implementation and enforcement of the policies
adopted, developing new cooperative mechanisms, and doing
all of this with due regard to respect for civil liberties.
Maintaining momentum is likely to be difficult once the
immediate pressures to produce policy subside. Rifts between
members have already started to surface, which might slow
down the pace of cooperation. Such rifts can spell stagnation
in a decision-making environment that is still governed by
unanimity. Unlike the dossiers communitarized by Amsterdam
which might move towards Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)
and (possibly) co-decision in 2004, JHA cooperation in criminal
matters currently has no such prospects. There might now be a
unique opportunity to negotiate the normalization of the residual
Third Pillar and the extension of QMV to criminal matters.
This, and the decision to move towards QMV in the
communitarized parts of JHA will be a significant challenge
for the EU. Some member states—those who argued for the
complete communitarization of the Third Pillar in the first
place—would like to see police cooperation moved into the
Community system. Others argue that keeping police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters intergovernmental
affords a level of flexibility to governments that have concerns
about the pace and extent of the Europeanization of sensitive
issues. Another linked challenge is improving the position of
the Commission, the Parliament, and the Court in JHA.
Otherwise, the marginalization of the European Parliament and
the exclusion of the European Court of Justice from the
decision-making process are likely to sustain criticism of the
functioning of JHA cooperation in general and keep the debate
on accountability and the democratic deficit alive.
In addition to the institutional difficulties that are likely to
persist at least until 2004, future progress in developing policies
to ensure internal security is likely to be conditioned by each
member state’s level of comfort with developing additional
policies. Countries such as France, Spain, and the UK are very
sensitive to issues of terrorism because of their first-hand
experience and are at the forefront of urging EU-wide efforts.
Others (such as the Scandinavian countries) find it hard to
maintain popular support for far-reaching governmental and
EU-wide policies that might be seen as circumscribing civil
liberties. A multi-speed process is a tempting possible solution
to the willingness differential between member states. This, of
course, is nothing new. Amsterdam Treaty formalized opt-ins
for the UK, Ireland, and Denmark in JHA matters, leaving the
door open for speedier integration by some members while
providing  an  opportunity  for  skeptics to set their own pace.
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proposals. For example, at the February 15 Council meeting at
Santiago de Compostela, Spain, the UK, France, Belgium,
Portugal and Luxembourg announced their intention to
implement the European arrest warrant in early 2003, a year
ahead of the previously negotiated date. But, even this flexible
approach to forge forward with the “willing and ready” is not
a sure thing: barely two weeks after pledging its resolve, the
UK announced on February 28 that it was postponing the
introduction of the legislative initiative that would have made
the early implementation of the European arrest warrant
possible. JHA cooperation to date has already produced a
several-speed Europe replete with complex operational
problems.
Moreover, developing policies is one thing, implementing
and enforcing them is another. The success of the ambitious
internal security blueprint hinges on the effective approximation
of the judicial systems of the member states, and the creation
of effective joint agencies for police and prosecutors. This
requires overcoming entrenched reluctances at the national
level, which is likely to occur at a significantly slower pace.
The institutions that are charged with spearheading cross-border
cooperation in criminal matters (Europol and Eurojust)—while
groundbreaking prototypes—each have their own
implementation and enforcement problems. Currently, Europol
does not have enforcement powers if member states refuse to
cooperate with its requests. Unlike national law enforcement
units, it cannot arrest or detain people. And Eurojust is far from
a European prosecutor’s office and appears to run the risk of
being reduced to another information exchange outfit. Europol
and Eurojust need to evolve into institutions endowed with real
powers and capacities. Furthermore, to address fears of runaway
European bureaucracies, clear lines of review and
accountability need to be established for both institutions.
Regardless of the level of cooperation, JHA issues are likely
to remain closely linked to security (Geddes, 2001). After the
initial burst of activity in the criminal field, collective attention
is likely to shift (back) to border control issues, with an
emphasis on thwarting illegal migration seen as a potential
breach of internal security. Since Maastricht, JHA ministers
have spent considerable time hammering out common standards
of entry into the Union. Now, several member states are arguing
that—especially in the face of growing numbers of unauthorized
entries—the EU needs to be even more careful about monitoring
immigrants and asylum seekers and perhaps even develop a
common European border guard to ensure the uniform
implementation of joint policies (Commission of the European
Communities, 2001). Previously proposed by Germany and
Italy and floated by Prodi soon after the attacks, the proposal
envisions cooperation possibilities ranging from exchange of
equipment and best practice to the creation of full-fledged joint
border patrol units. Even if a common border guard does not
materialize, however, the EU is likely to continue on its path of
tightening border controls and scrutinizing access into its
territory. These efforts also create pressures for nonmembers
to monitor and adapt to the EU’s emerging regulatory
environment and content in JHA. This is especially true for
those countries lining up for membership who are expected to
adopt the JHA acquis and contribute to the guarding of the
EU’s (future) borders (Lavenex and Uçarer, forthcoming 2002).
Another significant challenge is developing policies that
protect the security of those residing in its territory while
ensuring that human rights and civil liberties—including those
of suspects—are respected. This is a delicate line to walk. So
far, the EU’s anti-terrorism efforts have largely been supported
by the European populations. However, if the new measures
are not complemented with procedural and substantive
safeguards, the EU may see public support wane quickly. Civil
liberties proponents raise legitimate concerns about inadequate
parliamentary and judicial oversight of EU’s policy-making
bodies. Institutional reform that would ensure transparency and
accountability might help allay fears about a European Big
Brother.
Last but not least is the challenge to maintain the promise
of transatlantic cooperation in criminal investigations of major
offenses. This process may run into practical difficulties
previously masked by the urgency of the attacks. The Spanish
presidency hopes to negotiate with the U.S. an agreement on
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. However, extradition
to the U.S. is likely to become a thorny issue. Member states,
through the Council, can be expected to insist that an agreement
reached with the U.S. must comply with the Union’s stance on
the death penalty. At a minimum, the EU is likely to insist that
death penalties that result from extradition not be carried out.
The momentum towards developing joint efforts can also be
hampered by differing views on how individuals extradited on
suspicion of terrorist activities should be tried. As negotiations
on the U.S.-EU extradition treaty proceed, the EU is likely to
resist extraditing individuals who might be tried by military
tribunals.
Navigating the sensitive waters of JHA cooperation has
never been easy. But the EU has nonetheless made significant
progress in an area that is at the heart of state sovereignty. Now,
invigorated by the unfortunate events of September 11, the EU
is presented with a unique opportunity to rethink its institutional
mechanisms that have slowed down progress and hampered
efforts to create the AFSJ. Whether the EU will rise to the
challenges that come hand in hand with this occasion and
maintain the momentum forged by September 11 remains to
be seen.
Emek M. Uçarer is assistant professor of international
relations at Bucknell University.
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Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes
1. Terrorist acts were defined as intentional acts which may
“seriously damage a country or an international organization …
with the aim of (i) seriously intimidating a population, or (ii)
unduly compelling a Government or an international
organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or
(iii) seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental
political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a
country or an international organization” (Council of the
European Union, 2001b).
2. Included in the list are the Basque separatist group ETA,
three Greek organizations, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the violent
wing of Hamas, several Irish groupings, and individuals with
links to these groups. Perhaps as interesting is who is not
included in the list. Notably absent on the list are groups such
as the Irish Republican Army (which has recently de-
commissioned some of its weapons), Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and
the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party).